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Abstract 
In the available literature on ecobalances, relatively little attention 
has until now been devoted m the discussion of the ultimate objec- 
tives of ecocontrolling, i.e. to the determination of those elements of 
nature which deserve highest protection. The goal of this paper is m 
elaborate and m provide grounds for a target-system of ecocontrol- 
ling based upon existing concepts in the environmental ethics. 
The immediate connection between ethical consideratinns and the 
target-system of ccoconrrolling arises from the fact that the ethical 
notion of 'intrinsic value' (applied on elements of nature), and the 
concept of "safegtmrd suhiect' used in literature on ecocontrolling 
and ecobalances appear congruent. Principally, it would bc desir- 
able that the safeguard suhjccts consist only of natural elements 
with an intrinsic value - within the chosen approach of environ- 
mental ethics. However, in order to reach an optmaal operational- 
ization, it appears unavoidable to put elements of nature with an in- 
trinsic value and those elements that do not possess uch a wlluc 
(but which operationalize elements with an intrinsic value) together 
in the list of the safeguard subjects. 
Relying on the theoretical and practical analysis, a list of safeguard 
subjects imilar that from (~ONSOI.I et al. is proposed. The ethical 
frame allows for a new insight, the idea that there is a hierarchy be- 
tween the different safeguard subjects, and that a limited influence 
on a safeguard suhjcct of lower rank does not have to bc considered 
an impairment of the corresponding safeguard suhiccr. 
Keywords: Safeguard subjects; value setting; environmental ethics; 
moral subject; intrinsic value; anthropocentrism; sustainable 
development 
1 Introduction 
The goal of ecocontrolling, and particularly that of ecobal- 
ances, is to provide an instrument to firms which enables 
them to record and then diminish their negative impacts on 
the environment. In the quantitative approaches to ecobal- 
ances, one attempts to obtain the most precise quantifica- 
tion of the impairment of the environment accounting for 
the utilization of natural resources I and for emissions and 
waste generated in the life cycle of products or services. 2 
t The natural resources are not recorded to ecobalances in every approach, since not  
every approach considers natural resources as belonging to the safeguard subjects. 
2 Here, we use a life cycle assessment according to CLM/Goedkoop. Other ap- 
proaches can of course be used as well. Here and in the remainder of this pa- 
per, however, we will use the conceptual categories as well as the correspond- 
ing terms which have been introduced in the life cycle assessment according to 
CLM/Goedkoop (see GOEDKOOP, 1995). 
For that purpose, one initially prepares an int,entory of 
those by-products of the industrial activities relevant for 
the environment, hese are then assigned to some impact 
categories using an assignment schema (classification) and 
a quantitative weighting system (characterization). Those 
impact categories are finally weighted (weighting) and as- 
signed to some safeguard subjects. These safeguard sub- 
jects are nothing else than elements of the natural environ- 
ment which are considered to bc intrinsically worth being 
protected. If the impaimlcnts of the safeguard subjects arc 
relatively balanced against one another (value setting), :all 
environmental impact can bc expressed through a nun3bcr: 
the eco-indicator value. 
Even though there arc differences between the various ap- 
proaches availahle today, existing literature on ccocontrol- 
ling and ccobalances only discusses the topic of safeguard 
subjects and their valuation t to a sntall degree. From my 
point of view, this doesn't come as a surprise, since reason- 
ing for the choice of safeguard subjects and their valuation 
should be made out of an environmental ethical argunten- 
tation. However, ethical contemplation is almost unknown 
in the discussions on ecocontrolling and ecobalances which 
is dominated by aspects of natural science. This paper will 
develop some basic ideas which will lead to a welFfounded 
choice of safeguard subjects. Here, considerations of envi- 
ronmental ethics, as well as possibilities of operationaliza- 
tion, are carefully taken into account. 
The paper is structured as follows: in the next chapter we 
will present and discuss different approaches of environ- 
mental ethics, in the third chapter the existing proposals to 
the safeguard subjects and their valuation will be intro- 
duced and discussed, and an own proposal will be devel- 
oped and motivated. The paper ends with a brief conclu- 
sion. 
2 Ethical Positions Dealing with Nature 
2.1 Basic questions of environmental ethics 
In dealing with nature, different ethical approaches from 
different perspectives exist. These approaches provide dif- 
The valuation results from the weighting and the value setting. 
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ferent answers to the same general questions; the most im- 
portant ethical aspects, discussed in the following para- 
graphs, result out of these three basic questions: 
9 Who or what is a moral subject, or in other words, who 
possesses moral rights? 
9 Which elements of nature have an intrinsic value? And 
which elements, in contrast, have a derived value? 
9 What are the basic rights of the elements of nature that 
deserve an intrinsic value? 
The first question deals with the problem of determining the 
criteria as to which moral rights should be assigned, espe- 
cially whether only humans or also other living creatures or 
even inanimate lements of nature should possess uch rights. 
The second question discusses a point of great importance 
to this paper. By answering this question, it should be 
stated which elements of nature actually have a value them- 
selves, and are eo ipso worth being protected and which, in 
contrast, should be protected only because they are of im- 
portance to one of the valuable elements. In general, the 
elements that are judged as intrinsically valuable also count 
for being moral subjects. This means that the answers to 
the two corresponding questions are the same. 4
The third question concerns which rights have the elements 
of nature with an intrinsic value: If, for example, the hu- 
man being, in an anthropocentric frame, aside from having 
the right to live and the right to health, also has the right 
to a psychok)gical welfare; if, in a pathocentric frame, sen- 
tient beings, aside from the right to live also have a right to 
a dignified life; and so forth. 
Following BIRNBACHER (BIRNBACHER, 199l), the next para- 
graphs will show four different approaches to ecological 
ethics . 
2.2 Anthropocentrism 
In the anthropocentric approach, only the human being is 
seen as a moral subject. Moral rights can generally only be 
assigned if the subject underlies moral duties. Now, be- 
cause moral behavior demands rationality, autonomy and 
freedom, which are all exclusive characteristics of humans, 
anthropocentrists conclude that only humans can be seen 
as moral subjects (see BAYERTZ, 1987, p. 161). According 
to this, they assume that only human life, human health 
and human welfare of today's and future generations de- 
serve an intrinsic value. Elements of the non-human ature 
only deserve a derived value, to the extent hat they inter- 
act with the human beings. 
Within the anthropocentric approach, two different views 
exist. They differ in the definition of the basic rights of hu- 
4 In the setting of this paper, we simply assume that natural e ements which ave 
an intrinsic value are also ethical subjects. Occasionally, wefind ethical ap- 
proaches where this assumption cannot be adopted (see BIRNBACHER, 1991, 
p. 285). 
s In the discussion about the ethical reasons which shall shape the relations of
human beings to non-human nature, one frequently distinguishes between - 
vironmental ethics, which is understood as relying on the traditional anthro- 
pocentric view, and ecological ethics, which is considered to be more open to 
the 'interests' of the non-human nature. This distinction, however, is contro- 
versial (see BIRNBACHER, 1991, p. 278f.). In this paper, we will not deal with it 
and will instead use the two terms as synonyms. 
mans and in the way the rights of elements of the non-hu- 
man nature are derived. In the frame of a tighter anthro- 
pocentric approach (strong anthropocentrism), thephysi- 
cal welfare of humans is underlined, and the living as well 
as the inanimate lements of nature only have an instru- 
mental value. These elements only represent a value when 
supporting human life and human physical welfare 
through their productivity. In the view of a broadened an- 
thropocentric approach (weak anthropocentrism), thepsy- 
chological welfare of humans has a higher value, and the 
risks generated by the influence of human activities on the 
natural environment are emphasized. This is why nature is 
valuated higher. Environmental goods next to their pri- 
mary economical productive function also reflect an aes- 
thetic, recreative, even a religious value on the one hand 
and, on the other hand, stand as a sort of 'life insurance' 
for future generations. 
Important elements of an anthropocentric approach are an 
enlightened self-interest, fairness in the meaning of ecologi- 
cally equal rights for every human being, and the responsi- 
bility for our future in the sense of a 'stewardship for nature'. 
The anthropocentric approach, however, leaves ome ques- 
tions ()pen: 
9 Why should we require rationality or linguistic ahility as 
criteria for characterizing a moral subject? 
9 Why should merely humans have an intrinsic value? Why 
can't sentient animals have an intrinsic value, although 
severely handicapped humans who cannot speak or think 
logically possess an intrinsic value? 
9 In strong anthropocentrism, we generally find the danger 
of instrumentalizing ature: Only those elements which 
have an immediate monetary value are also cunsidered 
worth being protected. However, not only in strong an- 
thropocentrism, but also in weak anthropocentrism we 
find ethics as being subordinate to human advantages: In
today's political decision-making, this can mean that the 
material and aesthetic interests which will concert1 humans 
in a far future are consequently put last with regard to the 
present material interests (see YON GLEICH, 1989, p. 78f.). 
2.3 Pathocentrism 
Some questions left open in the anthropocentric approach 
can be answered using the pathocentric approach. In this 
ethical approach, the qualification of a moral subject is not 
measured in rationality, autonomy or linguistic abilities, but 
in the capacity of having sensations and feeling pain. This 
can be called the ethics of bounding pain: the sentient crea- 
ture, which in the pathocentric approach is mostly identi- 
fied with an animal with a higher organizational degree, 
should not have to sustain pain, fear or stress. According to 
this, all sentient beings possess an intrinsic value. 
The pathocentric approach, however, leaves the questions 
about the definition and the delimitation of the basic rights 
of non-human moral subjects open: 
9 Can human pain be compared with animal pain? For ex- 
ample, how far can animal experiments be ethically jus- 
tifiable? 
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9 Are we allowed to kill animals without a strict necessary 
reason? 
9 Next to the duties of omission towards animals, 6 are 
there also any duties of active help exist? 
9 Do animals have a right to live with dignity? 
2.4 Biocentrism 
In the frame of biocentrism, all creatures possess the qual- 
ity of moral subjects and have an intrinsic moral value. The 
intrinsic value can be possessed by natural individuals or 
by natural collectives uch as ecosystems or species. A cer- 
tain downgrading of the intrinsic value according to the 
biok)gical organization is compatible with this approach. 
The biocentric approach faces different problems: 
9 The argument hat every living creature or every species 
deserves an intrinsic value is based on an ethical point of 
view, which is pre-modern and transcendental. The exis- 
tence of living nature's own rights is an ethical a-priori 
based on the so-called naturalistic fallacy: by setting val- 
ties in nature, one deduces from the actual quality of 
what "is' the normative conclusion of what 'should be'. 7 
9 Principally, it is not clear why all forms of life should be 
protected. Why should the existence of a pox virus which 
is harmful for humans be protectcd? X And even if this 
seems to be worth protecting, such radical protection 
would not be realizable if applied to the single living bc- 
ing and not to the species. 
9 A partial solution would be to legitimate a downgrading 
of the intrinsic value of the creatures, according to their 
biological organization. Unfortunately, only few biocen- 
trists try to put tiffs possibility in concrete terms. What 
nevertheless remains ()pen is the question concerning the 
criteria which shall be applied in the weighting of human 
interests against hose of non-human living nature. 
9 Moreover,  it is not convincing why the evolut ionary 
change from inanimate to living matter should make the 
whole ethical difference. Why should the Matterhorn 
have less value than a slime mold? 
2.5 Holism 
In the holistic approach, all elements of nature, living or 
inanimate, possess an intrinsic value. The holist can relate 
the assignment of intrinsic values to certain aesthetic, struc- 
tural or historic features. As in the biocentric approach, 
these features can concern natural individuals or natural 
collectives uch as landscapes, biotopes or the stock of a 
non-biotic natural resource. 
In this context, he duty of omission means the duty to avoid causing pain. 
7 Against the naturalistic fallacy, GROH and GROH argue that nature isnot suit- 
able as a measure ofvalues, because the natural values are influenced by hu- 
man perception. Our relationship to nature ismarked by our culture; one can- 
not escape this epistemological anthropocentrism ( ee GROH; GROH, 1993). 
s EHRENFELD argues that he harmful pox virus has a right o existence since it 
already existed evolutionarily before humans - and therefore, reasoned by age, 
deserves an intrinsic value (EHRENFELD, 1978, p. 208). BIRNBACHER opposes 
this since, if value is based on age, inanimate elements would then deserve a 
higher degree than living elements (BIP.NBaCHEP., 1991, p. 307). WOLTFP, S, on 
the other hand, declares that it is not only allowed, but even imperative to ex- 
terminate harmful species (WOLTEP, S, 1995, p. 246). 
Principally, the holistic approach faces the same problems 
as the biocentric approach. Further problems come from 
the fact that the holistic position is often teleologically 
founded: according to this, nature has a certain purpose 
which is good and humans should subordinate themselves 
to this purpose. Objection to this view are as follows: 
9 Nature aside from humans strives for surviving matters 
only. Here, no ethical principles are evident. 
9 If humans are counted together with all their motives and 
actions as a part of nature, this would mean that the ex- 
ploitation of nature would also be something 'natural'. 
2.6 Ethical fundamentals of the concept of sustainable 
development 
In today's environmental discussion, the concept of sus- 
tainable development is of utmost importance. The defini- 
tion of sustainable development emerged from a continu- 
ing international discussion. The result of this discussion 
was a first binding consensus about the desirable form of 
the economical, social and ecological developments. 
Although neither the Brundtland-Report nor the Agenda 
21 still specially goes into aspects of environmental ethics, 
the ethical position Which supports the proposed sohitions 
of the environmental problems can be read between the 
lincs. The definition of sustainable development, for exam- 
pie, is formulated in terms of human needs: 
"Sustainable d veh~pmcnt is dcvclopnlent that meets the needs ~f the pre- 
sent without compromising the ability of future generations tonicer ihcir 
own needs I.-. I The satisfaction ofhuman eeds and aspirations i  the ma- 
jor objective of development I.--I In essence, sustainable dcvclol+mlent is a 
process of change in which the exl~loitalion of resources, the direction of 
investments, the orientation of technological development, and institu- 
tional change are all in harmony and ellJl:lnce botla current and future po- 
tential to meet human needs and aspirations." (The World Commission 
on Elwirolunent and Developnlent, 199 I, p. 43ff.; my emphasis)" 
Thus, it seems that sustainability is based on an all in all 
anthropocentr ic perspective. Occasionally, however, we 
find biocentric arguments. This mixture of views appears, 
for example, in the analysis of the extinction of species: 
sometimes argumentat ions are used that originate in a 
tightly understood anthropocentrism (see The World Com- 
mission on Environment and Development,  1991, p. 
147f.), sometimes the intrinsic value of biodiversity is em- 
phasized (see UNEP, 1992, Preamble). I~ 
Even when arguments with an anthropocentric character 
seem to dominate, sustainability appears to be ambiguous in 
another espect: the authors of the Brundtland-Report and of 
the Agenda 21 phrase it in such an open manner that it is hard 
to tell if their understanding of sustainability tends to rely on 
a strong or rather than on a weak anthropocentrism, u 
See also the first principle in the Agenda 21: "Human beings are at the cen- 
tre of concerns for sustainable d velopment. They are entitled to a healthy 
and productive life in harmonv with nature." (UNCED, 1992, p. 9) 
l0 One notices that he Convention on Binlogical Diversity is an international 
contract, including material obligations. 
II Mostly economical arguments are used, which originate from a narrower an- 
thropocentric point of view. Sometimes, however, non-economical arguments 
are used, which is typical for a broadened anthropocentric view. See, for ex- 
ample, The World Commission  Environment and Development, 1991, p. 
155 or UNCED, 1992, p. 131. 
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2.7 Discussion 
As explained in the preceding paragraphs, each of the ap- 
proaches of ecological ethics presented here has some weak- 
nesses. From this point of view, none of the presented posi- 
tions can be preferred absolutely. However, in today's per- 
spective, the pre-modern character of the biocentric and the 
holistic approaches demonstrates major drawbacks. A mod- 
ern environmental ethics should only be derived from gen- 
erally accepted assumptions, uch as the recognition of the 
vulnerability of humans, and eventually even of sentient an- 
imals, or the rational belief in the discourse as being the site 
where morals are generated. Knowing this, the anthro- 
pocentric or the pathocentric approach seems preferable. 
However, this does not mean that the biocentric and the 
holistic approach ave not provided extensive support for 
the development of a form of ecological ethics which cor- 
responds to the requirements of a modern world. These po- 
sitions, which often rely on metaphysical or emotional ar- 
guments, express a feeling that comes too short in the ra- 
tionally faultless argumentation of the anthropocentrists. 
In the words of VON GI.EICH: 
"A 'primary ethical impulse' still exists in our population. We are still 
aware of the beauty of landscapes, which is being ruined. We even have 
an awareness of the "integrity' of organisms, which is slowly being dc- 
stroycd by intensive animal breeding, experimentations on animals, sur- 
gical interventions and genetic engineering. We are still aware that such 
interventions arc not "good', but we have tremendous problems in ex- 
plaining anad reasoning this rationally." (W)N GL.EICll, 1989, p. 79f.; my 
translation) 
Because of this 'ethical feeling', it seems justified to prefer 
ecological ethics which cover most of nature's functions. 
From my point of view, weak anthropocentrism or patho- 
centrism provides a better account for suitably dealing with 
nature, and with this, for an entrepreneurially-directed 
form of environmental protection such as ecocontrolling. 
3 Safeguard Subjects and Value Setting 
In modern literature about ecocontrolling and ecobalances, 
different approaches for the determination of the ecologi- 
cal safeguard subjects and of their valuation are suggested. 
The thoughts which have been elaborated out of the theo- 
retical analysis of the previous chapter will form the basis 
for the discussion of some of these approaches. 
3.1 Requirements on safeguard subjects and value setting 
From an ethical-theoretical point of view, it seems natural 
to choose those elements of nature with an intrinsic value 
as safeguard subjects. The concept of ecocontrolling, how- 
ever, primarily has a practical importance; to form it in a 
operationable manner, some short-cuts and simplifications 
are unavoidable. The ethical foundation and the opera- 
tionability form the poles of an area of conflict in which 
the choice of the safeguard subjects has to be positioned. 
Safeguard subjects, moreover, are requested to form a com- 
plete system in the sense that every ecological impact 
should, in some way, lead to an impairment of at least one 
safeguard subject. This is why the number of safeguard 
subjects hould not be too low. From the point of view of 
operationability and clarity, the number of safeguard sub- 
jects should not be too high either. I'- 
The valuation of the safeguard subjects in an ideal case 
should be based on an ethically well-founded iscourse 
within the society. However, because of the young age and 
the limited public questioning of ecocontrolling as a scien- 
tific instrument, a public discourse about the ideal and rel- 
ative valuation of the safeguard subjects cannot be ex- 
pected in the near future. Because of this, it seems very im- 
portant hat, at least in the small circle of the experts on 
ecocontrolling and other interested parties, well-founded 
arguments for one or the other valuation system be devel- 
oped. Such a discourse, however, can only take place if 
agreement about the safeguard subjects is given, a situation 
which is not yet the case. 
The public or at least the scientific acceptance is a precon- 
dition for supporting the choice and the valuation of the 
safeguard subjects with the necessary stability. Stability is 
another important requirement concerning the safeguard 
subjects and their valuation. We have to hinder as much as 
possible an ongoing change of the valuation factors which 
constricts us to a continuous adjtnstment of the instruments 
of ecocontrolling. 
3.2 The EPS system 
The system called EPS (Environnnental Priority Strategy) was 
developed for Volvo in Sweden (see S'rEEN; RYI)IN(;, 1992). 
The EPS-system states five different safeguard subjects: 
9 Nattlra[ resuurces, 
9 Human health, 
9 Economical productivity, especially in agriculture, 
9 Biodiversity and 
9 Aesthetic values of nature. 
The value setting results from a monetarization of the costs 
caused by the impairment of the safeguard subjects. 
The costs caused by the depletion of natural resources are 
measured through future extraction costs. In other words, 
one estimates either the costs caused by the extraction of 
the last reserve of a given resource, or the costs for a suit- 
able substitute. The costs of lowering productivity are 
quantified by the estimated loss of income in agriculture or 
in industrial production. The costs for an impairment of 
the remaining safeguard subjects are determined by the es- 
timated social willingness to pay. 
The complete environmental impairment, which arises 
from the worsening of the state of some safeguard subjects, 
is in this way expressed as an amount of money. 
3.3 The proposal of Consoli et al. 
In the al~sproach of CONSOLI et al., the following safeguard 
subjects are proposed: 
l: A high number of safeguard subjects requires a complicated system of 
coefficients for value setting which should show the public prefer- 
ences for each safeguard subject. The development of such a system 
would be problematic. 
13 CONSOLI et al. use the term general protection areas. 
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9 Natural  resonrces, 
9 Human health and 
9 Ecological health (see C():'~s()l.I ct al., 1993, p. 23). 
In Table 3-1 of CON'~OLI et al.'s paper, effects on safeguard 
subjects are assigned to certain specific impact categories. 
These effects, however, are only understood qualitatively 
and are only differentiated between direct and indirect ef- 
fects (see CONSOi.I et al., 1993, p. 27). The authors do not 
state an explicit value setting, but they mention a proce- 
dure which helps with the determination of such a value 
setting: mainly it consists of decision theory techniques 
which include the advice of experts as well as the 
consideration of public preferences. The methods used can 
be of a qualitative or quantitative nature, whereby the 
valuation factors remain implicit in the qualitative value 
setting methods (see CONSOI.I et al., 1993, p. 25). 
The main direction that still needs to be investigated for the 
determination of the value setting is specified in paragraph 
8.4 of CoNsoI.I et al.'s paper (see CONSOLi et al., 1993, p. 61 ). 
3.4 The proposal of Gocdkoop 
In 1995, GOEI)KOOP developed a system which should al- 
low us to quantifiably cover all environmental impairments 
in Europe (see GOEDKOOI', 1995). The following safeguard 
subjects are used in this approach: 
9 Ecosystems and 
9 Human health (see (IOEI)KOOP, 1995, p. 22). 
The impact on an ecosystem is measured according to the 
percentile lowering of the corresponding soil surface or of 
the corresponding water volume. The effect on human 
health is measured by way of two factors: the number of 
deaths caused by a negative nvironmental influence and 
the number of non-lethal health impairments occurring be- 
cause of smog periods (see GOI-:DKOOt,, 1995, p. 25). 
The neglect of further safeguard subjects, which could ac- 
count for further negative nvironmental influences uch as 
depletion of natural resources, local environmental prob- 
lems like odor, noise and light, or the production of final 
waste and toxic effects which cause only local problems, is 
justified argumentatively b  GOEDKOOP (see GOEDKOOP,  
1995, p. 22ff.). 
GOEDKOOP proposes the following equivalence coefficients 
between the safeguard subjects: one additional death per 
million inhabitants per year, health complaints caused by 
smog periods, TM and an impairment of 5 % of an ecosystem 
(see GOEDKOOP, 1995, p. 25f.). ls 
Thanks to these equivalence coefficients, any impairment 
of the safeguard subjects can be compared to any another, 
and all negative nvironmental influences can be expressed 
in one dimension (e.g. the additional number of deaths per 
million inhabitants per year). 
14 This coefficient is not quautitativdy specified by GOEDKOOP - and so cannot 
be considered as a value setting coefficient. 
is These equivalence coefficients mean that an impairment of 5 % of an ecosys- 
tem, which takes place over n years, should be considered as equivalent to n 
additional deaths per million inhabitants in the examinated area. 
3.5 The proposal of Miiller-Wenk and Braunschweig 
MOLI .ER-WENK and BRAUNSCHWEIG understand their input 
as an addition and improvement of the approach of GoEl)- 
KOOP. Their paper for the first time provides a clearly de- 
fined and operationable set of safeguard subjects (see 
MULLER-WENK; BRAUNSCHWEIG, 1996, p. 213ff.). 
The following safeguard subjects are proposed: 
9 Human health and 
9 Biodiversity. 
Compared to the approach of GOEDKOOP, the environmen- 
tal impairment is measured in a more restrictive, but also 
more precise manner. Here, not the whole influence on 
ecosystems, but only the effect on the spreading of the 
species, is taken into consideration. 
The instruments used for measuring the changes in the 
safeguard subjects are carefully choosen. To measure the 
impairment of human health, the day of sickness is used as 
the unit of measurement. One day of life less caused by an 
environmental impact is considered equivalent to N days of 
sickness, t~ The authors suggest N = 10. In this way, an 
equivalence between the impairment of health and cases of 
death is established. To measure the decreasing of species, 
the percentile lowering of their geographical spreading is 
taken into consideration. However, because tiffs measuring 
leads to an unsolutionable practical problem, v7 M{II.I.IR- 
WENK and BRAUNSCI IWI ' I ( ;  suggest wo alternative solu- 
tions: 1 ) the geographical extent of a representative part of 
the European. is species or 2) the change in the extensmn of 
the habitats of the entire European species hould be used 
as a unit of measurement for the decreasing of species (see 
M{II.I.Ir BRAt~NSC:IIWII(;, 1996, p. 215f.). A value 
setting coefficient between the two safeguard subjects of 
'lluman health' and 'biodiversity' is not given explicitly. 
Further possible safeguard subjects such as natural re- 
sources, natural productivity, aestiletic values or quality of 
life are being discussed, although they are not yet inchided 
in the list of the safeguard subjects. Tllese decisions are 
founded argt, mentatively. MOLI.ER-WENK and BRAUN- 
SCHWEIG also assume that emissions, followed by impair- 
ment of health without spreading into the environmental 
media, do not form an influence to be taken into ecobal- 
ances (see MULLER-WENK; BRAUNSCHWEIG, 1996, p. 214). 
3.6 Discussion 
In paragraph 2.7, I came to the conclusion that only the 
weak anthropocentrism or the pathocentrism comes up to 
the requirements of modern, not transcendentally founded 
ethics, at the same time not showing a reductionistical un- 
derstanding for nature. This is the starting point of my fi- 
nal conclusion. 
16 A day of sickness is defined as a situation where a person is not able to fol- 
low its normal activities. See MLJLI.ER-WENK; BRAUNSCHWEIG, 1996, p. 214. 
17 There are about 200,000 existing species in Europe. It would be practically 
impossible to control the geographical spreading of them all. 
i s  There are about 2,500 different and already classified habitats in Europe. To 
control the change of their geographic extension seems easier than to control 
the change of the geographical spreading of every species. 
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From an ethical-theoretical point of view, the safeguard sub- 
jects in an ecobalance model should be those natural ele- 
ments which possess an intrinsic value. In the frame of a 
weak anthropocentric approach, human life, human health 
and human welfare deserve the characteristics of a safe- 
guard subject. If one Chooses a pathocentric approach, one 
has to add the life and eventually also the health and wel- 
fare of sentient animals to the catalog of safeguard subjects. 
As already mentioned in paragraph 2.3, the pathocentric 
approach, however, does not answer the question which ba- 
sic rights animals with a higher degree of organization 
should and can have. In order to avoid these difficulties in 
the following discussion, the weak anthropocentrism will be 
chosen as an ethical basis. This is also justified since the 
problem of the protection of animals, especially of the sen- 
tient animals, does not play a major role in ecobalancing. 19 
As already mentioned, weak anthropocentrism uggests the 
choice of following safeguard subjects: 'human life and hu- 
man health', as well as 'human welfare'. While the safe- 
guard subject 'human life and human health' is already pre- 
cisely implemented in the literature concerned with ecobal- 
21} . ~ ~ . . antes, the safeguard sublect human welfare ns still very 
vague. The first question that comes up is whether or not 
human welfare is subordinate to human health. For me, a 
striking answer to this is given by the statement of REICHE 
and FOLGRAFF: 
"No matter which envirmlmental ethical approach we assume, the safe- 
guard subiecr nature is more extensive than the safeguard subiect hu- 
man health ]...] Protected isthe existence of the [...] natural goods as 
objects of the enjoyment ofnature, of the artistic and cultural products, 
as useful objects, as resources and as an expression of the variety of 
life." (REI(:HI~; FtrlC;RM:I:, 1987, p. 247; my translation) 
To indirectly justify the protection of natural goods in regard 
of their positive influence on the health of today's and future 
generations, would be very laborious. Apart from this, this 
constraint to indirectly argue could be dangerous since envi- 
ronmental protection ormally appears to be less important 
than many other concerns of today's living humans: this 
would lead to a disadvantage for future generations. 
A second possibility would be to add the safeguard subject 
'human welfare' directly into the list of the safeguard sub- 
jects. However, two reasons can be held against this. 
Firstly, human welfare doesn't have to come out of the ex- 
perience of untouched nature, but it can also be generated 
by activities which contribute to the destruction of nature. 
For example, it seems to be undisputable that, for many of 
today's living humans, consumption patterns that actually 
destroy nature generate welfare. From the point of view of 
sustainabitity, future generations may have to face severe 
problems, if human welfare would be regarded as a safe- 
guard subject. Secondly, even without this occurring, hu- 
man welfare should not be chosen as a safeguard subject 
because it is not operationable enough. 
I~ Of  course, there are economic sectors where the choice of a pathocentric in- 
s tead  o f  an  anthropocent r i c  approach makes a big difference, e.g. sectors 
where xperimentation on animals or unnatural forms of animal breeding are 
practiced for reasons of production. These problems are not discussed here. 
For further information see BIRN~ACHEg, 1991, p. 310ff. 
20 This safeguard subject is measured at best by adopting MOLLER-WENK and 
BRAUNSCHWEIG'S suggestions. Seeparagraph 3.5. 
Let me suggest a possible;solution. The part of today's and 
tomorrow's human welfare that is generated by using, en- 
joying and experiencing untouched nature can be ex- 
pressed through some alternative measurement units which 
on the one hand delimitate the nature-focused welfare but, 
on the other hand, make it more precise and operationable. 
To replace the welfare generated by nature, l propose the 
two following units of measurement: natural and semi-nat- 
ural habitats as well as natural resources. 
Natural and semi-natural habitats indicate living spaces of 
animals and plants which have relatively little contact with 
human beings. In Europe, about 2,500 different ypes of 
such habitats have been classified (see STA.~NEkS, 1995, p. 
530). These encompass extensively managed agri- and silvi- 
cultural landscapes (semi-natural habitats; see STANNERS, 
1995, p. 172ff.), as well as ecosystems (natural habitats; see 
STANNERS, 1995, p. 190ff.). To measure the impairment of 
the natural and semi-natural habitats, one can measure the 
change in the extention of the totality of these habitats. 21 
The impact on the safeguard subject 'natural resources" can 
be measured through the diminishing of their reserves. 
The choice of these safeguard st, bjects brings two advan- 
tages. Firstly, a lot of important natural elements are 
recorded. The protection of semi-natural habitats and 
ecosystems indirectly ensures the protection of animals, 
plants, landscapes and the conservation of aesthetic values 
of nature and, in this, ensures important components of the 
psychical welfare of today's and tomorrow's generation gen- 
erated by nature. The protection of the biotic and abiotic re- 
sources assures the production and the consumption, and 
consequently the physical welfare, of all generations. 22 Sec- 
ondly, through this choice, the ethical problem that appears, 
when biodiversity ischosen as a safeguard subject, is solved: 
If natural and semi-natural habitats instead of species are 
chosen as a safeguard subject, it is possible to eradicate such 
harmful species as, for example, the pox virus. 
Summarizing, I would propose the following safeguard 
subjects: 
9 Human health~ 
9 Natural and semi-natural habitats and 
9 Natural resources. 
Essentially, my proposal is also quite similar to that of 
CONSOLI et al. Between the approach of CONSOLI et al. 
and mine, however, there is an important difference: here 
only the safeguard subject 'human health' deserves an 
However, it must be granted that ecosystems are not replaced by semi-natural 
habitats. 
Keeping standards of today's consumption is an important element of the liv- 
ing standard and, with this, of the welfare. To justify the protection of re- 
sources indirectly over the protection of human life and human health would 
be problematic since the necessity of arguing indirectly would lead to an over- 
valuation of today's concerns, which again would interfere with the legitimate 
claims of future generations on a suitable consumption. One could well argue 
that an excessive depletion of today's oil resources means a limitation of the 
production possibility for our descendants; this would lead to lower incomes 
which would naturally cause restrictions in the medical care sector. The 
health of future generations would then not be granted as our health. Obvi- 
ously, this argumentation is very awkward and easy to attack. Now, facing 
the eminent meaning of the natural resources for the ensurance of an appro- 
priate living standard and physical welfare, it seems inevitable to include nat- 
ural resources in the list of the safeguard subjects. 
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intrinsic value, the natural and semi-natural habitats as well 
as the natural resources possess only a derivated value. 2~ At 
least theoretically, this means that the protection of the last 
two mentioned safeguard subjects could be limited. Not all 
impacts on ecosystems or depletions of a natural resource 
have to lead to a decrease in the welfare generated by na- 
ture. Of course, such a 'limited right to impair' cannot be es- 
tablished for the safeguard subject 'human health'. 
The practical determination f the limited right to impair for 
environmental influences is best determined by looking at 
the definition of sustainable development. Accordingly, an 
abioric resource is exploitable as long as the diminution of 
its reserves i  compensated through a higher efficiency of uti- 
lization or as long as the quantity of a biotic substitute is 
raised correspondingly. This means that the maximal imit of 
utilization of an abiotic resource is determined by its degree 
of substitutability or by the increase in the efficiency of ex- 
ploitation. According to this, the exploitation of an abiotic 
resource only has to be classified as impairment of the cor- 
responding safeguard subject when the exploitation rate is 
higher than the growth rate of the efficiency of utilization, or 
higher than the growth rate of a renewable substitute: Analo- 
gously, the exploitation of a biotic resource can only then be 
considered as the impairment of a safeguard subject when the 
exploitation rate is higher than the regeneration rate. 
The practical determination of the limited right to impair a 
natural or a semi-natural habitat is much more difficult be- 
cause of its multifunctionality. Criteria of caution suggest 
setting the limited right to impair to zero. Accordingly, any 
interference in an ecosystem or in an extensively managed 
agricultural landscape has to be considered as an impair- 
ment of the corresponding safeguard subject. 
A well-founded iscussion about a suitable value setting 
for the suggested safeguard subjects is premature at this 
stage, and goes beyond the scope of this paper. However, 
we can notice that the value setting of the safeguard subject 
'natural resources' against he other safeguard subjects is 
only then admitted when the effective xploitation of a re- 
source is higher than its maximally permissible xploita- 
tion degree (given by the limited right to impair). 
4 Conc lus ion  
In today's available literature on ecobalances, the discus- 
sion of the target system does not play an important role. 
However, it seems indisputable that the choice of suitable 
safeguard subjects is of primary importance in order to de- 
termine the gravity of the impact of human activities on the 
environment. For instance, entering natural resources into 
the list of the safeguard subjects means that their depletion 
has to be considered as an environmental impairment to be 
recorded by an ecobalance. This paper attempts to provide 
a methodological and practical contr ibut ion to a well- 
founded choice of the safeguard subjects. From a methodo- 
logical point of view, this paper suggests that the impor- 
tance of ethical arguments has to be taken into considera- 
z3 In the proposal of CONSOLI et al., neither the nature of the safeguard subjects 
nor their equivalence relation isexamined closely. 
tion increasingly. This will be possible only if experts of 
ethics will be deeper involved in the ongoing discussion on 
the target system of ecocontrolling and ecobalances. From 
the practical point of view, a concrete set of safeguard sub- 
jects is proposed. 
Moreover, the paper suggests ome indications for further 
research work. 
In order to be an applicable instrument, ecobalances must 
rely on a quite stable target system. In my opinion, this ini- 
tially requires to recognize the importance of the choice of 
suitable safeguard subjects and then to come m a consen- 
sus about the chosen safeguard subjects as soon as possible. 
In order to reach a sustainable agreement, it is necessary to 
increasingly involve not only experts of ecocontrolling or 
ethics, but every interested party in the discussion on the 
target system of ecocontrolling. 
The rapid attainment of a binding agreement about the safe- 
guard subjects would allow the determination f a value set- 
ting in the near future in order to complete the program of 
developing a quantitative instrument for recording every en- 
vironmental impact caused by economic activities. 
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